NOTE: Case notes are necessarily incomplete. The only authoritative pronouncement of the Court's reasons and conclusions is that contained in the published reasons for judgment.
Dimitrovski v Boland [2023] FCAFC 86
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – where applicant a discharged bankrupt – where applicant sought leave to appeal and extension of time to appeal from decision of Supreme Court of New South Wales – where applicant included claim for damages for personal injuries – where primary judge held personal injury claims were not severable from the property claims – whether s 160(2)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) was enlivened such that the claims had not vested in the trustee of the applicant’s bankrupt estate – where proposed grounds of appeal have no merit – application dismissed
Federal Court of Australia - Judgment of Markovic, Downes and Kennett JJ - 31 May 2023
Background
In 2004, George Dimitrovski invested $500,000 in Life Order Products Pty Ltd, a company associated with Brian and Helen Boland.
In June 2021, Mr Dimitrovski and his sister Susan Vasil commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against Mr and Mrs Boland, their accountant and an associated company.
In their statement of claim, Mr Dimitrovski and Ms Vasil alleged, among other things, that Mr and Mrs Boland made false representations regarding Life Order Products and, in June 2009, passed company resolutions which had the effect of stripping the company of its assets, transferring its patents to related parties and destroying Mr Dimitrovski’s investment.
Mr Dimitrovski and Ms Vasil sought various orders for compensation, damages, declarations, and injunctions under Australian Consumer Law, the Corporations Act 2001 and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act as damages in tort on the grounds that the alleged conduct caused them to suffer ‘physical and psychiatric damage’ and ‘extreme trauma, disappointment and distress’.
At the time of commencing the proceedings, Mr Dimitrovski was a former bankrupt, having been declared bankrupt on 9 December 2013 and subsequently discharged from bankruptcy on 21 December 2016.
The proceedings in the Supreme Court were summarily dismissed on the basis that there was no reasonable cause of action to be brought by Mr Dimitrovski because any cause of action vested in his trustee in bankruptcy.
The proceedings included a claim in damages for personal injury, a cause of action that may remain with the bankrupt pursuant to s60(4)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (the Act) and the damages from which may be indivisible to creditors pursuant to s116(2)(g) of the Act.
At first instance, Lindsay J commented that the personal injury claim in the circumstances was ‘inextricably interwoven with the financial matters’ such that any cause of action in respect of the personal injury also vests in Mr Dimitrovski’s trustee in bankruptcy.
Mr Dimitrovski sought leave to appeal and an extension of time to appeal the decision of the Supreme Court.
Appeal grounds
Among the five grounds of appeal, Mr Dimitrovski argued that the primary judge erred in construing s116 of the Act in that the claim for damages for alleged personal injury does not vest in his trustee in bankruptcy. The Court dismissed this argument as without merit.
In considering the relevant authorities, their Honours had regard to Allsop P’s discussion in Moss v Eaglestone (2011) 83 NSWLR 476, noting that a difficulty arises where property and personal damage arise from the same cause of action. The relevant point is whether the personal action is severable from, or directly related to, or consequential upon, the property claim [at 50].
In Mr Dimitrovski’s case, their Honours confirmed that the primary causes of action concerned the pecuniary loss to Mr Dimitrovski’s property, and that the personal injury claim was ‘inextricably linked to and/or consequential upon those claims’ [at 53].
On the remaining grounds of appeal, Mr Dimitrovski variously contended that the primary judge had insufficient regard to the causes of action pleaded and erred in his findings where there was no evidence or facts in support of those findings. These grounds were also dismissed on the basis that the primary judge did not make any findings as to the adequacy of evidence or draw any inferences based on facts in reaching his conclusions.
Their Honours reiterated that the proceedings were summarily dismissed because Mr Dimitrovski did not have standing to bring them.